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5. The Regional Service Council Levy
Roy Bahl and David Solomon
INTRODUCTION
South African local governments
metropolitan (category A) and
district ( category C) municipalities - rely heavily on revenues from the
Regional Service Council (RSC) levy. The RSC levy is not one, but
two taxes: a flat rate payroll tax and a flat rate turnover tax. This levy
allows local governments to tap into the broad revenue bases of payroll
and gross receipts, and to generate a significant revenue flow. But the
RSC levy has a legal basis that makes it almost impossible to properly
administer, and as a result it fails when measured against most of the
criteria for a 'good' local tax. There have been numerous calls for its
review and reform. 1
We begin this analysis with a question: How does the RSC levy
match up against the norms for a good tax? We then turn to a study of
the South African experience with this tax. In order to study the RSC
levy, we analyzed available data and conducted interviews in a (non
representative) sample of municipalities. Given the time frame of our
work, the basic research necessarily focused on the pre-demarcation
municipalities. In the results presented here, we first discuss the
administration of the RSC levy. Next, we do a detailed, primarily
economic evaluation of its current structure and performance. Finally,
we review a number of possible options for reforming the RSC levy,
outlining the advantages and disadvantages of each.

IS THE RSC LEVY A 'GOOD' LOCAL TAX?
One standard by which to evaluate the RSC levy is the set of normative
criteria for a 'good tax' that most economists agree with.2 These
criteria, which are presented in more detail in Chapter 3, include
127
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revenue adequacy to cover budgetary requirements, revenue elasticity
with respect to expenditure needs, equity, administrative feasibility,
neutrality with respect to market decisions, and political acceptability.
To these basic maxims, we add some special requirements for a good
local government tax, some of which relate to the critical fiscal
decentralization policy choices outlined in Chapter 1.3 These include a
correspondence between those who bear the burden of a local
government tax and those who enjoy the benefits of the expenditures
financed by the tax, and the provision of adequate fiscal autonomy.
Finally, there is always a concern about the impact of the local
government tax regime on fiscal disparities within the country.
Even a quick look at this simplified list indicates that no single tax
will satisfy all of these criteria. The government always will be left
with a choice among taxes that do some things well and other things
less well. The policy decision comes down to which goals the
government most wants to emphasize. This is precisely the issue we
raise here. Should South Africa live with the significant flaws in the
RSC levy in order to capture the benefits that the RSC levy offers? Can
the RSC levy be restructured to redress some of its flaws while
retaining its strengths? A broader question is whether the RSC is a
revenue source on which the government can base its long-run program
of fiscal decentralization.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE RSC LEVY
To properly understand and evaluate the RSC levy, one must
understand its administration. In fact, the assessment and collection of
the RSC levy makes it a very different tax from that which is described
in the law. To describe the administration of the RSC levy, we can
consider five basic steps in tax administration:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identification of the taxpayer.
Record-keeping.
Assessment of tax liability.
Collection.
Audit.
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Identification

The first step in tax administration is to identify and register the
taxpayer in order to build a tax roll. The law requires that each
enterprise, whether profit making or not, register for the RSC levy.
In theory, there are a number of ways to identify businesses that are
liable for the RSC levy. The local government could receive data on
VAT and income tax registrants from the national government
collector; do casual inspections; require joint registration for the RSC
levy, property tax, and utility services; and/or make RSC registration a
requirement for purchasing a local business license. Based on our
fieldwork in a limited sample of pre-demarcation metropolitan and
district councils, the first two of these approaches are followed in South
Africa, though there appears to be great variation across the country and
certainly between urban and rural areas. The business license check is
not an option because South African local governments do not require a
general business license. While the property tax and public utility
collection procedures are linked, there is no such relationship between
either the property tax or public utility charges and the RSC levy.
There is a great deal of variation across the country as regards
cooperation with the South African Revenue Service (SARS), the
national tax administration agency, in registering taxpayers for the RSC
levy. At one extreme, there appears to be quite a close relationship that
works well:
A method utilized by some councils with a local office of the receiver of
revenue (e.g., Lekoa-Vaal Metropolitan Council (MC) in Vereenignig;
Sentrale Karoo District Council (DC) in Beaufort West; Southern DC in
Klerksdorp) is quite successful. In collaboration with the local receiver's
office, a person can only register a new business with the receiver (i.e.,
SARS) after he/she has registered as a RSC levy-payer with the applicable
DC and has furnished the necessary evidence to the receiver's office
(Franzsen, de Lange, and Calitz, 2000, p. 25).
In other councils, however, the cooperation between the local finance
officers and SARS would appear to give less complete results and other
methods must be used. The cases of the urbanized Cape Town MC and
less urbanized Breede River DC in Worcester are instructive. Cape
Town relies heavily on VAT registration and PAYE registration reports
received from the national government collector. However, such
reliance on registrations leaves out businesses that fail to register for
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VAT, including most of the informal sector. Current law places no
obligation on finns with less than R50,000 per annum turnover to
register for VAT, though it is often in their interest to do so in order to
claim VAT credits. If a firm fails to register for VAT, they will not
automatically be included in the RSC tax rolls.4 In Cape Town MC,
there were about 33,000 taxpayers in the net in I 994-1995. A report by
the auditor general estimates that 30 percent of all finns were not in the
base. For the most part, these are small firms in the infonnal sector
(Smit, undated). Cape Town MC also uses an informal process of
'finding' new finns by an inspection method. This involves 'drive
bys', a study of telephone book entries, and casual observation.
The Breede River DC cooperates with the national government
collector in much the same way. They receive a list of all new VAT
registrants and in fact have a reciprocal exchange agreement with the
local Commissioner for Inland Revenue. (They also send the list of any
new RSC registrants to the Commissioner.) Breede River DC also uses
'informal methods' to identify potential RSC levy payers. These
methods range from studying business advertising (newspapers,
signage, telephone book) to drive-by, visual inspection. In some
councils, private contractors have been employed on a commission
basis to identify potential new taxpayers.
Record-Keeping

It would appear that the tax rolls (however complete or incomplete) are
in reasonable shape. In all councils visited in the course of this research,
the tax records were computerized and properly kept. Franzsen, de
Lange, and Calitz (2000) report a similar finding from their field work
in district councils.
There are some issues with record-keeping that still need to be
resolved. The most important relate to a numbering system for
taxpayers. The RSC levy, the property tax, the VAT and income taxes
do not carry the same taxpayer identification number. Moreover, the
national, provincial, and municipal database management systems are
not integrated or even compatible. It would not appear possible to
perform even elementary database functions, such as crosschecking
payment amounts or comparing tax bases. If ever the local governments
were to be given authority to fully administer the RSC tax, then such
cross checks would be a necessary tool.
Another problem that arises is eliminating firms from the tax roll as
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they go out of business. This results in unnecessary administrative costs
(Franzsen, de Lange, and Calitz, 2000, p. 26). The Rustenberg DC
finance office reports that about 8,000 business entities are registered
for the tax, but only about 5,000 are active. About 50 percent of those
on the roll owe less than R50. A recent survey in Cape Town (Cape
Town Metropolitan Council, 2000) determined that of 38,000 firms
currently registered for the RSC levy, 2,750 had gone out of business.
Another 10,000 had not yet been contacted as part of the survey.
Therefore, the number of non-active firms on the roll could be between
7 and 34 percent of those registered.
The registration for the RSC levy does not require enough data from
each firm to support appropriate policy research. It would be desirable
for the registration form to have information on, at least, (a) sector of
operations, and (b) number of employees. This would allow the
government to determine sectors (types of firms) where it should
concentrate its collection efforts. Moreover, such information would
allow the local government to evaluate the response of RSC levies to
changes in local economic structure, business cycles, etc.

Assessment
The base of the RSC levy is gross sales and total payrolls. However,
the tax base is self-declared and the local council is not permitted to
inspect the books of account of a company. Nor is the council entitled
to make its own assessment. In effect, the local government plays no
role in determining tax liability. This is arguably the major problem
with the RSC levy. In many ways, the RSC levy more closely
resembles a donation than it does a tax.
The only good recourse to the assessment dilemma, to request
information from SARS, apparently meets with only limited success. 5
The response during our field visits suggests something other than a
close cooperation:
• In Breede River DC it was reported that the national government
collector has been willing to cooperate, though the requests for
such cooperation have been limited. In '50 or 60 cases' in the
past few years, the collector has used VAT and PAYE returns to
compute true tax liability and returned this information to the
local government for processing. There are about 5,000 returns
in all.
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• In Cape Town MC, underassessment is also seen as a major
problem. The financial office recalled how the local government
tried, on one occasion, to station a person at the office of the
Commissioner to collect information. The Commissioner was,
however, reluctant to break confidentiality, or to devote time and
resources to the activity. As a result, the effort was never
implemented. According to the financial office, Cape Town MC
does from time to time request the commissioner to supply
information to assist in the assessment, but they do not get close
cooperation. In some cases, they do receive information from the
collector, but it 'takes weeks'.
• Both the Rustenberg and Brits DC finance offices noted little
cooperation from the collector. In Brits it was reported that they
had asked for information, and some was provided in 1997. Since
that time, none has been provided. There is no history of
cooperation in Rustenberg, and little expectation that there will
be cooperation.
The view from SARS (Pretoria) is a bit different. 6 They see some
evidence of cooperation between the SARS and the district office. It
was noted that whenever a PA YE audit was done, the payment of RSC
(payroll) levy was 'encouraged'. However, they also noted that SARS
offices had the priority of collecting national taxes: 'priorities need to
be where the money is'.
By law, the local council is not empowered to make assess ments.
Despite this legal limitation (upheld in the widely-referred-to Buchner
case7), councils do make assessments (Solomon, 1998). However, 1'f
the company refuses to pay upon receipt of a summons, and enters a
request for appearance in court, the local government has traditionally
withdrawn the summons (Franzsen, de Lange, and Calitz, 2000, p. 31 ).
Collection

The collection process is very informal. Enterprises are 'expected' to
mail in their returns, or pay in person, and apparently most large firms
do this. If a finn does not voluntarily pay, then a 'procedure' is
followed. Though this procedure likely varies across the country, some
district councils mail a bill to delinquents with an inflated tax liability:
'50 percent higher than last year', according to one local finance officer
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visited. As noted above, the law specifically prohibits this, but it is
done anyway.
Since true tax liability is not known, it is not possible to estimate a
proper collection rate, i.e., the ratio of taxes collected to taxes owed.
We do know, however, that the delinquent list is quite large. 8
A common practice is to use private collectors to collect arrears, on a
commission basis. The practice of using collectors seems to vary
widely among district councils, as indicated by the following snapshots:
• Breede River DC uses private tax collectors and pays them a
commission equivalent, on average, to 17.5 percent of what they
collect. These collectors are not regulated, nor are they closely
monitored. They are essentially free agents who make house
calls. Many complaints have been received from the public about
the tactics used by collectors, and about their apparent lack of
supervision. The Finance Officer also identified several serious
malpractices, such as claiming fees for registering companies that
clearly would have complied without help, and claiming for
retrieving payments made to the wrong district council (which
added nothing to the overall tax collection). Despite such
problems, private collectors do produce significant revenue,
according to the Finance Officer. The Breede River DC has
become so reliant on them that it has no regular employees who
serve the collection function.
• The Cape Town MC does not use private collectors.
• The Brits DC makes use of private collectors. These collectors
bring in an amount equivalent to about 10 percent of revenue. and
they are paid a commission of about 15 percent. They work onlv
on the collection of arrears, from a list of non-payers ( t;r
suspected under-reporters) supplied by the district council. Thcv
also work on registration. The collectors are independent of th�
finance office, and work directly with the council. The district
council collector is 'out of the loop' as regards supervision of the
collectors.
• The Rustenberg �C �se � a �rivate collector. He is reported to he
_
qmte successful m bnngmg m additional revenue. He works nnl v
on ac ��unts that are in arrears, and operates with littl�
superv1S1on.
• Many other councils use collectors, without complaint or
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incident , and some councils have
introduced 'codes of conduct'
(Fra nzsen, de Lange, and Cali tz,
2000, pp. 35-37).
SARS takes a dim view of the
use of collectors as not 'the right way' to
enforce tax compliance. One
complaint was that when the SARS
receiver turned over evidence
to the district, there was a fear that this
information would be turned
over to the collectors. Clearly, this is a
violation of the law. SARS
reports receiving numerous complaints
about collectors. The essence
of these complaints is that private
collectors have 'overstepped
their powers, and are not properly
restrained by the district cou
ncils'.
Audit and Penalty

1,

I

Local governments are not perm
itted to audit the books of a taxpayer,
or even challenge the selfassessment. They may pursue non-payers,
but there is no penalty for non
_
-payment. The interest rate due on unpaid
balances is about 13 percent,
which is below the market rate. It is rare
for a non-payer to be taken
to court. One council reported no follow up
at all on undeclared taxes sin
ce 1996.
Franzsen, de Lange, and Cali
tz (2000, p. 38) received question naire
responses concerning penaltie
s and enforcement from 38 districts, and
reached the following concl
usions:
1. Some councils have recently
refrained from handing over the names
of delinquents to attorneys
for prosecution. The reasons, include:
a. The legal costs involved
are t oo high;
b. The amounts claimed are
usually based on estimated assessm ents
by the council - which
would in all probability not stand up in
court (in the light of the Buc
hner case ); and
c. Private collection age
nts are successful in collec ng these
ti
amounts.
2. Some councils do not
follow up effectively on non-pa
yment. Lack of
capacity and the cost
s inv
Uncertainty about municipa olved are given as main reason s.
l boundaries also was a con
straint prior
to the new dem
arcation
3. Only a few councils exercise in 2000.
indicated that they experi
enced proble ms
regarding for ma l appeal
s in connection with the
enforcement of
payme?t of levies (e. .,
� Amatola DC, Johannesburg MC, uThukela
DC, Htghveld DC). Disp
utes are generally settled
outside the courts.

-
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4. The Southern DC in North West utilizes 'clearance certificates' to
ensure payment from rural property owners. The Registrar of Deeds
wi11 not transfer a property to a new owner unless the RSC liability
of the seller has been settled.

EVALUATION OF THE RSC LEVY
The RSC levy is really two separate taxes, one on turnover and the
other on payro11s. Both are charged against employers. By law, the
coverage of the tax base for both components is quite broad. There are
relatively few exemptions and deductions, and the tax threshold is very
low. However, as noted above, the administrative practice narrows this
base considerably. Originally, the local government, with approval of
the Minister of Finance, set the tax rate. Since 1996, however, the rate
has been effectively frozen, i.e., no rate increases have been approved.
The district or metropolitan council that collects the tax retains a11 the
revenues. The structure suggests that the RSC levy, even if properly
administered, would be less a local tax than an intergovernmental
transfer that is distributed by origin of co11ections.

Revenue Performance
In 1998-1999 the RSC levy yielded R3 .1 billion, equivalent to 1 .9
percent of total national government tax revenues and 0.47 percent of
GDP (Table 5.1). The income elasticity of the RSC levy over the
1995-1996 to I998-1999 period was I.7, i.e., for every 10 percent
increase in revenue over that period, RSC revenue increased by 17
percent. However, if we exclude the 'abnormal' fiscal year of 19971998 when RSC levy revenues increased by 38 percent, the GDP
elasticity has been below unity (0.9 4 in 1999, and0.42 in 1997). 9 Even
so, we might conclude that this is not a weak elasticity for the RSC
levies. The GDP elasticity for 1999 for the income tax on individuals
Was 0.9 , and that for the VAT was 0.7. Despite the poor administration
some combination of increased registrations and increased declaration�
?f turnover and payrolls led to a growth that nearly kept pace with
income, and did as well as individual income tax and VAT. Given the
self-assessment feature of the tax, and the absence of a threat of audit or
Penalty, this is an amazingly good revenue performance.
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Table 5.1 Revenue performance of the RSC levy

Year

Revenue (in
billion rand)

1994-1995
1995-1996
199�1997
1997-1998
1998-1999

1.9
2.0
2.1
2.9
3.1

Revenue
as a % Income
GDP (in
Percent
increase billion rand) ofGDP elasticity
5.26
5.00
38.10
6.90

497.3
556.2
609.6
654.0

0.40
0.38
0.48
0.4 7

0.42
4.05
0.94

Source: Franzsen, de Lange and Calitz (2000), p. 11; Manche (1996); Department
ofFinance (1999); Department ofFinance, Budget Reviews (I 996-1999).

Revenue Importance

The data in Table 5.2 indicate that the revenue importance ofthe RSC
levies in the metros (column 2) varies from a low of7.7 percent oftot al
local government revenue in Durban to a high of over 40 percent in
Khayalami. A revenue reliance ofas large as one-third in Cape Town,
for example, means that any reform package must include a suitable
alternative source of revenue. To abolish the RSC levy without
identifying a replacement revenue source would be an unthinkable
intergovernmental policy action.
It would be even more unthinkable for the rural districts. Outside
the metros, the RSC levy is the only significant revenue source ofmost
district councils. It often accounts for almost all oftotal district council
revenue (de Lange, 1998, p. 7). For the country as a whole, the RSC
levy is as important a financing source for local governments as are
current transfers. Again, the story is that the RSC levy would be a very
difficult revenue source to replace.
Vertical Equity

The two components of the RSC levy are likely to have two very
different incidence patterns. The turnover tax is levied on gross receipts
with very few exclusions. It accounts for about two-thirds of RSC
revenues. This tax is likely to be borne in proportion to consum ption
and will be regressive in its distribution of burdens. 10 The facts that
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Table 5.2 RSC levy revenue performance in metros: 1997-1998
Percent of
national RSC
levy revenue
Cape Town
Durban
Johannesburg
Khayalami
Lekoa-Vaal
Pretoria

National

12.75
8.09
20.96
3.54
1.88
8.16

100.00

Percent of total
local revenue
33.3

1.1
18.2
41.7
na
14.1

Per capita
amount
(in rand)
188
88
228
189
84
182

145

Source: Columns (I) and (3) from Solomon (1998); column (2) from Franzsen, de
Lange, and Calitz (2000) p. 8.

there are few exclusions (even food items are taxed) and that the
threshold of the tax is low suggest that the RSC-turnover tax will be
more regressive than the VAT in its distribution of tax burdens.
However, the administration of the RSC levy might soften this
regressivity. The informal sector (where one might expect many low
income families work and trade) is largely excluded from the tax rolls.
Smit (undated) estimates that about 30 percent of potential levy payers
in the Western Cape in 1994-1995 were not registered, and that most of
these were in the informal sector.
The payroll tax component (about one-third of total RSC revenue) is
not as regressive as the turnover tax. Its incidence pattern, however, is
not intuitively obvious. Low-income workers in the informal sector
will not be in the base because their employers will not likely be
registered. High-income individuals who are self-employed also will
be outside the base. Finally, non-labor income (e.g., dividends.
interests, rents, royalties) is not taxed under a payroll levy, making the
RSC levy less progressive than the income tax.
One might conclude from this that the RSC levy probably adds an
element of regressivity to the South African tax structure. However.
since it only accounts for about 0.5 percent of GDP, it will not have a
significant effect on the overall distribution of tax burdens.11
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Horizontal Equity

'Fairness' in taxation requires that peopl
e/businesses in the same
circumstances be treated the same. The
RSC levy does not get bad
marks on this count. By law, the tax is
very broad-based, and it covers
virtually all sales transactions and all wage,
salary, and fringe benefit
payments. In theory, few transactions
are exempt and few types of
workers are excluded. In many ways, the
RSC levy is more horizontally
fair than the VAT or the income tax.
There are three areas, howe ver, where
the RSC levy introduces
horizontal inequities. The first two
have to do with shortcomings in
administering the tax, the third with a
structural problem:
1. A worker in the informal sector is
not as likely to be subject to the
payroll tax as a worker in the formal sector
, even if the two earn the
same wage.
2. A transaction in the informal secto
r is not as likely to be taxed as is
an identical transaction in the form
al sector.
3. A vertically integrated firm pays
less gross receipts tax than does a
firm that is not vertically integrated.
There is also the issue of the arbitrarin
ess of assessment and collections.
Companies simply pay what they think
they should under a system of
self-assessment, with little fear
of penalty in the event of under
declaration. Some delinquent taxpa
yers, and some who are deemed to
underreport, are singled out for the
attention of collectors and likely
will end up facing an arbitrarily
determined effective rate of taxation.
The more 'savvy' a taxpayer, the
lower his burden, and the more honest
a taxpayer, the higher her burd
en. Honesty and knowledge of how to
beat the system do not qualify as
'reasonable' criteria for discriminating
among taxpayers. Arbitrarines
s in assessment usually leads to
horizontal inequities in the distribu
tion of tax burdens.
These exceptions notwithstand
ing, the RSC levy is potentially a
broad-based and fair tax. The
grounds for reforming the structure of
the RSC levy probably ought
not to include violations of the horizontal
equity maxim of a good tax.
Neutrality

A good tax will not interfere wit
h market-driven choices abo
ut business
decisions. The RSC levy violate
s the neutrality rule in two wa
ys. First,
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the turnover tax distorts market prices because the tax is pyramided
forward at every stage of the production process (Manche, 1996).
Because of this, a firm is given an incentive to vertically integrate some
of its production and distribution processes. In this way, it may avoid
paying the gross receipts tax at some stages of production. There is no
available evidence on whether South African firms have integrated to
capture this advantage. It is clearly true, however, that a vertically
integrated firm, ceteris paribus, pays a lower tax than one that is not
vertically integrated.
The other neutrality problem relates to the payroll tax. All other
things being the same, an employer will find labor more costly because
of this tax, and will have an incentive to substitute capital for labor at
the margin. Though we have little information that enables us to predict
how firms would react to the tax, an impressionistic view is that this
might be a controversial tax strategy in a labor surplus economy. It is
true that the RSC tax rate is quite low, but a different view might
emerge if one considers the marginal impact of the RSC rate in a
system that already includes other taxes on labor.
Administration Costs12
A well-administered tax is one that possesses
characteristics:
•
•
•
•

the

following

A high proportion of true tax liability is collected.
Administration costs are 'reasonable'.
Compliance costs are 'reasonable'.
There is a minimum of arbitrariness in assessment and collection.

To �v �luate the de�ee to which the South African RSC levy is well
adtmmstered, we might consider three hypotheses:
Hypothesis No. 1: A high percent of true tax liability is collected
The RSC levy probably fails this test badly. Because there are no data
_
available to the local _g�vernment on the true amount of taxable payrolls
or taxable turnover, 1t 1s not possible to estimate how much of the tax
goes uncolle �ted. However, given that there is a low probability of a
�x . evader bemg detected, and a very minor penalty if there is detection
1t 1s a reasonable proposition that the percent of true tax liabilit;
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collected is very low . This would lead us to the conclusion that
'collection costs' are very high.
Hypothesis No. 2: Administrative costs are reasonable

Whether this statement is true or false depends on how one defines
collection costs. Under the broadest definition, the costs of collection
are composed of:
• Leakage from the system (evasion) due to poor administration;
• Skimming by private collectors, and other corruption; and
• The actual cost of the administrative apparatus.
The numerator of the 'collection ratio' includes some or all of these
costs, and the denominator is the actual amount collected. We cannot
empirically estimate the first two of these 'cost of collection' items, but
we can imagine that in the case of the RSC levy, they could easily
exceed total collections. This would give a collection cost ratio of more
than I 00 percent.
A second way to think about the cost of collection is to estimate
what it would cost to collect the RSC levy, if it were fully implemented
according to legal base and rate, and if a target collection rate were set.
We cannot make an estimate of this amount either. However, at the
time the RSC levy was adopted, some critics argued that the collection
rate would exceed 80 percent of collections and that 'legions of
bureaucrats' would be required (Smit, undated).
Perhaps the narrowest view of the collection ratio is to look only at
the amounts paid for the present administrative apparatus, and divide
this by the actual amounts collected. Using this method, we come to an
estimate of collection cost equivalent to less than 2 percent of
collections (Smit, undated; and de Lange, 1998). By this narrowest
view, the collection cost is quite modest. In some cases, however,
collection costs under this definition have been estimated to be as high
as 20 percent (Franzsen, de Lange, and Calitz, 2000, p. 15).
Hypothesis No. 3: Compliance costs are reasonable

The RSC levy is self-assessed and the taxpayer is not required to show
supporting evidence, nor is he/she subject to audit. Some district
councils do hire collectors on a fee basis, and firms must contend with
them when they try (illegally) to inspect books of accounts or to make
assessments. However, because of the absence of enforcement, one
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would have to conclude that the present RSC levy imposes little
compliance cost.
.
.
Another way to look at compliance cost 1s to consider the case that
would hold if the tax were to be properly enforced. Clearly the
compliance cost would be higher. Both turnover and payroll are already
reported for purposes of other taxes, but some adjustments will be
required for the RSC levy because of its broader base. More important,
however, is that the RSC levy would require a reporting by place of
employment, and possibly by the place where the transaction took
place, and this would impose a greater burden on those who must
comply.
Finally, there is the issue of the unsophisticated taxpayers, i.e., those
new to the market. Franzsen, de Lange, and Calitz (p. 15) note that
"... some councils including homeland areas not taxed before 1996,
report that 'new' levy-payers (many of whom are not literate) struggle
to comply with the provisions of the Acts and Regulations."
Ease of compliance also requires a good taxpayer information and
assistance program. Such assistance is not always in place. For
example, one financial officer interviewed noted that the district council
had produced an informational brochure on the requirement to register
and the mechanism for doing so, but that 'there were no brochures
available at the present time'.
Fiscal Disparities
There are wide disparities across district councils in the yield of the
RSC levy. Over half of total collections take place in the six
metropolitan areas (Table 5.2). The per capita collection of RSC levies
varies from a high of R l ,848 in Eastern Gauteng to less than RI o 111
five provinces, around a mean level of RI45 (Bahl and Solomon. 200
J ).
What are the determinants of this variation among the districts'.'
Why do some district councils raise more on a per capita basis than do
others? _We can study this question with a regression analysis
where
per_ capt� RS_C levy _is the dependent variable. The
e·xplanatorv
vanables tn th1s �nalys1s are population size, the per
capita level 1;f
_
output of th� d1stn
ct economy, Gross Geographic Product ( ( i(;
p ). and a
dummy vanable to reflect etro status. It is
important to include a
�
measure of overall economic condition as
an explanatorv van;ihk
0
nfortu
nately there are no ava·1
· ·
I a ble, annual measures
.
of value-added
'
bY d 1sm· ct. w e have chosen to use ' gross geog
raphic product·. wh i ch 1,
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an index of the total amount of remuneration paid to al l factors of
production (Statistics South Africa, 1995). This is the only measure of
district l evel output that is avail abl e. 13 It is expected that per capita
coll ections will be positively associated with the l evel of economic
activity in the area, the size of the population, and metro status.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.3. We can
expl ain about 75 percent of the variation in per capita RSC levy
coll ections with variations in per capita GGP, population size and metr o
_
l ocation. On average, a 10 percent higher level of per capita GOP is
associated with an 8.94 percent higher l evel of per capita RSC levy
revenue. Even after controlling for the level of per capita GOP a�d
popul ation size, we find that metro council s collect about R2 more m
per capita RSC l evies than do non-metro council s. We can find no
significant rel ationship between population size and per capita RSC
levy revenue.
Differences in the association between per capita GGP and per
capita collections for the turnover and payroll tax components are
described in the remaining three columns ofTable 5.3. The level of p er
capita turnover tax collections is more responsive to higher levels of
output (measured by per capita GGP) than is the payroll tax.
What we may take away from this analysis is that the RSC levy
significantl y accentuates fi scal disparities between rich and p oor
provinces. Council s in metro areas, and councils with higher l evels of
income, will raise more RSC revenue on a per capita basis, even ifthe y
do not levy a higher rate oftax. 14
Benefits and Burdens
Fol lowing the correspondence principle for a good local tax, we can say
that those who pay the RSC l evy should be, more or l ess, the ones who
enjoy the services financed by the l evy. This 'correspondence' principle
guards against residents overspending on gov e rnment services because
they are able to export the burden oftheir tax.
Especial ly the turnover component of the RSC levy raises the
correspondence issue. Though there is some arbitrariness in the tax l aw
about where tax l iabil ity should rest, the practice seems to gene rall y
agree that the revenue bel ongs to the jurisdiction where the tax is pai d
(as opposed to the jurisdiction where the transaction takes p l ace). So, if
headquarters ofcompanies generall y make the RSC levy payment, then
the tax benefit accrues to the headquarters cities, even though the
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Table 5.3 Ordinary least squares regression resultsfor per capita
RSC levy revenues*
Total
revenues

Turnover tax Payroll tax
Total
revenues
revenues
revei;iues

Constant

3.003

1.854

1.284

0.961

Per capita GGP

0.894
(9.416)

0.977
(11. 780)

1.032
(9.788)

0.889
(11.101)

0.746

0.673

0.722

-0.0806
(0.866)

Population
Metro location

0.620
(2,050)

R2

0.757

Notes: * !-values shown in parenthesis below regression coefficient. All variables

except the metro status dummy are expressed in logarithms. Data are for 47
districts for the fiscal year 1998-1999.

burden of the tax may be borne at the location of the consumption.
This means that the collecting jurisdiction is able to export part of its
tax burden, therefore it will have a direct incentive to overspend. The
payroll tax should fare better in this regard. The tax is generally
collected by the employer at the place of work and paid to that
jurisdiction. Since the benefit and burden areas match, the
correspondence problem does not arise. 15
To make an estimate of the degree of tax exporting, we have carried
out the following experiment. The first step is to estimate a 'normal' or
expected level of the turnover tax base. We do this by assuming that
the national average ratio of turnover to GGP, ( a), is the most
reasonable expectation, i.e.:

TTB

- L GGP

awhere:

I

I

I

47

(5.1)
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GGP is 3.48.
• This gives an 'estimated turnover tax revenue' ofR276 million.
• Actual turnover tax revenues in Cape Town were R312 million.
• The excess ofR36 million (column I) is assumed to be exported
to the rest ofthe country. This is equivalent to 11.4 percent of
total actual turnover tax collections in Cape Town (column 2).
We may use the results reported in the first two columns of Table 5.4 to
answer some important questions about who pays the RSC (turnover)
levy in South Africa. The six metros in South Africa collect 57 percent
of all turnover tax revenues. However, their residents are only burdened
with 48 percent of this tax and 9 percent is exported to consumers
elsewhere in South Africa. The negative entries in Table 5.4 reflect tax
importing, the positive entries reflect tax exporting. A more general
comparison of population size with the percent of turnover taxes
estimated is presented in Table 5.5.
We have carried out the same analysis for the payroll tax
component, as shown in columns (3) and (4) ofTable 5.4.16 As may be
seen from these data, much less of the payroll tax is exported. This
results because payrolls are more likely to be taxed at place of work
than at headquarters. For example, the six metros collected 51 percent
of total payroll taxes, and only 2 percent was exported to other districts.
The results for total RSC levy are shown in the last two columns of
Table 5.4. About 7 percent of the amount collected in metro areas is
estimated to be exported to the rest ofthe country.

Political Feasibility
There is no great hue and cry to abolish the RSC levy. Most individuals
probably do not realize that they are paying the tax. It is collected from
employers and passed to individuals in the form of lower wages or
profits, or rents that are lower than they otherwise would have been, or
in the price of the product sold. Moreover, the nominal tax rates are
very low, and the tax is not seen as onerous.
In fact, what makes the RSC levy acceptable is its weak
administration. If the tax were fully and properly administered, voters
might find it objectionable. It would be seen as regressive, exerting a
bias against labor, and introducing significant compliance and
administrative costs. In fact, because the RSC levy now functions very
much like a donation, it is not a source of widespread public discussion.

Table 5. 4 Estimated exporting/importing of turnover tax and payroll tax (in million rand)
District

.._

°'

-Is.

AmatolaDC
Benede OranjeDC
Bloem AreaDC
Bo KarooDC
BophirimaDC
Breede RiverDC
BushveldDC
Cape Town Metro
CentralDC
DiamantveldDC
DraknesbergDC
Durban Metro
EasternDC
Eastern Free StateDC
Eastern Gauteng DC
HantamDC
HighveldDC

Turnover tax
Amount
Percent
2.12
2.64
-1.06
-1.63
0.21
0.89
-4.06
35.59
7.99
0.36
-1.51
35.78
-27.47
-3.36
69.06
-1.22
10.24

6.1
76.2
-4.3
-61.5
8.2
7.1
-37.6
11.4
58.3
2.7
-71.6
21.7
-320.5
-33.44
34.2
-111.5
18.1

Payroll tax
Amount
Percent
-1.79
1.57
2.54
-0.89
0.18
1.20
0.28
-4.77
5.64
0.22
-0.51
9.06
7.76
-0.28
-6.76
-0.29
0.34

-11.9
78.7
14.3
-67.6
15.4
20.1
3.9
-7.2
72.3
3.3
-42.5
12.1
36.2
-4.3
-11.2
-59.1
1.5

Total RSC levy
Amount
Percent
0.34
4.21
1.48
-2.52
0.39
2.10
-3.78
30.82
13.63
0.58
-2.02
44.84
-19.71
-3.65
62.3
-1.51
10.58

0.7
77.1
3.5
-63.5
10.5
11.3
-21.0
8.2
63.4
2.9
-61.1
18.7
-65.7
-21.9
23.8
-95.3
13.2

District

.....

IlembeDC
IndlovuDC
Johannesburg Metro
KalahariDC
KeiDC
Klein KarooDC
Kyalami Metro
Lekoa-Vaal Metro
Lowveld EscarpmentDC
MzinyathiDC
NamaqualandDC
NorthernDC
Northern FreestateDC
OverbergDC
Pretoria Metro
RusetenbergDC
Sentrale KarooDC

Turnover tax
Percent
Amount
-22.62
7.1 I
96.01
-0.78
-13.80
-0.26
27.70
5.41
2.03
-21.33
-4.86
-3.10
3.05
-0.57
-4.52
7.96
-1.22

-496.4
20.7
22.l
-I1.4
-436.4
-8.8
37.7
13.5
8.1
-222.2
-135.7
-9.7
I1.9
-9.3
-2.7
39.0
-126.0

Payroll tax
Percent
Amount
-11.67
8.58
13.38
-1.27
-8.26
0.12
8.05
-1.26
0.78
-9.14
-2.14
-6.77
-4.82
-0.13
-8.25
7.23
-0.43

-520.1
38.I
7.2
-48.9
-441.0
6.8
25.5
-8.1
605
-136.4
-IOI.I
-61.0
-66.0
-3.8
-11.0
53.2
-64.9

Total RSC levy
Percent
Amount
-34.29
15.69
109.39
-2.05
-22.05
-0.14
35.74
4.15
2.81
-30.46
-7.01
-9.87
-1.77
-0.70
-12.77
15.19
-1.65

-504.2
27.6
17.6
21.6
-438.1
-3.0
34.0
7.5
7.6
-186.9
-122.9
-23.0
-5.4
-7.4
-5.3
44.7
-101.3

District

._

South CapeDC
SouthernDC
StormbergDC
UguDC
uThukelaDC
uThunguluDC
West CoastDC
Western GautengDC
Western RegionDC
Wild CoastDC
WinelandsDC
ZululandDC

Turnover tax
Percent
Amount

5.21
-5.25
-1.38
-7.65
1.30
19.54
-2.15
-7.32
6.78
-14.60
1.95
-1.42

36.0
-17.9
-37.2
14.6
49.0
-18.2
-22.9
8.6
-1501.8
7.0
-31.2

Payroll tax
Percent
Amount

1.58
-1.89
-0.08
10.48
-0.05
6.52
-0.64
-0.72
1.85
-3.48
0.46
-0.82

24.8
-16.8
-3.2
72.8
-1.3
38.6
-9.8
-3.7
4.8
-59.7
6.4
-36.4

Total RSC levy
Amount
Percent

6.79
-7.14
-1.46
2.83
1.25
26.06
-2.79
-8.04
8.63
-18.08
2.41
-2.24

32.6
-17.6
-23.5
19.7
9.8
45.9
-15.3
-15.7
7.3
-266.0
6.9
-33.0
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Table 5.5 Patterns for districts that are net exporters and net
importers of the turnover tax
Population above 1 million
Net exporters

Percent

AmatolaDC
Cape Town Metro
Durban Metro
HighveldDC
IndlovuDC
Johannesburg Metro
uThunguluDC
Western RegionDC

6.1
11.4
21.8
18.0
20.7
22.0
49.0
8.6

Net importers
KeiDC
NorthernDC
Pretoria Metro
Wild CoastDC

Percent
-436.3
-9.7
-2.7
-1501.8

Population between 500,000 and 1 million
Net exporters
BophirimaDC
CentralDC
Kyalami Metro
Lekoa-Vaal Metro
Lowveld EscarpmentDC
Rustenberg DC
uThukelaDC

Percent
8.1
58.3
37.6
13.5
8.1
39.0
14.5

Net importers

Percent

-4.2
Bloem AreaDC
-37.5
BushveldDC
-320.5
EasternDC
Eastern Free StateD C -33.3
-50.2
EastvaalDC
-43.8
GoldfieldsDC
-496.4
IlembeDC
-222.1
MzinyathiDC
-17.8
SouthernDC
-37.2
StormbergDC
na
UguDC
-31.2
ZululandDC

Who would object to a donation that they chose to make? There are,
nevertheless, complaints about the RSC levy and these are objections
that would no doubt become louder if a more significant RSC levy were
to be proposed.
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• There is fear that the RSC levy administration will be reformed to
allow local governments, or SARS, to make full and proper
assessment of RSC liability. In this case, many observers would
suspect that the courts would be faced with question of the
17
constitutionality of the RSC levy as a sales and/or income tax.
• Many businesses have objected to the imposition of a tax by
district councils when the business community has no
representation on the district council decision-making body
(Smit, undated, p. 24). This is more an emotional than a fair
argument, since it is individuals and not businesses that
ultimately bear the burden of the tax. But it is a point of political
contention.
• There is a complaint that the benefits of the tax do not reach the
taxpayers. Especially in the case of farmers, there is an argument
that they do not see any direct gain from the RSC levy in terms of
services provided (Franzsen, de Lange, and Calitz, 2000, p. 26).
For this reason, about 12 districts have provided a 'farm rebate'.
Legal Implications

The future of the RSC levy depends in part on the Courts. The
Constitution prohibits local governments from levying sales or income
taxes. The RSC levy clearly is both. The turnover tax is a general sales
tax, and the payroll tax is a tax on labor income. Surprisingly, the use
of the RSC levy at the local government level has not been challenged.
However, should the tax be levied at a significantly higher rate, it is
almost certain to be challenged.
A second legal issue has to do with the rights of the local
government to examine the books of account of a company when it
deems that tax liability has been under-declared. The position of the
court seems very clear on this. The local council may not impose an
assessment on a business, nor may it require a business to submit its
records for examination. The SARS collector may do both, and may
cooperate with the local council in assessment and collection, but this is
at the discretion of the collector (and the Minister of Finance). The
evidence to date seems to point to less than adequate cooperation
between SARS and local councils on the matter of RSC levy collection.
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OPTIONS FOR REFORM
There are many choices for reforming the RSC levy or replacing it.
The 'right' choice depends on the objectives that the government most
wants to achieve with the RSC levy. Perhaps most important, the
'right' choice will depend on expenditure assignment, i.e., on the
expenditure responsibilities given to the district municipalities, as
discussed in Chapter 2. With this qualification in mind, we may turn to
evaluation of what would appear to be feasible options for reform.
There are four decentralized solutions:
I. Leave the RSC levy as is.
2. Convert it to a true local tax and make proper provision for
administration.
3. Leave the RSC levy structure as it is, but turn the administration
over to SARS.
4. Abolish the RSC as it now exists and replace it with a piggyback on
the payroll tax.
There are two centralized solutions:
5. Abolish it altogether and replace it with a VAT-based grant to local
governments.
6. Abolish it altogether and replace it with an ad hoc grant.
Finally, there is a compromise (mixed) solution:
7. Do some combination of 4 and 6 above.
Option No. 1: Leave It As Is

There are good arguments for not making a major revision in the RSC
levy at the present time. Most important, it is revenue productive and
will be hard to replace quickly. There are some other features that make
it a candidate for survival. It is by now accepted by the public and
seems to be generally understood, the administrative and compliance
costs are low, and it is a relatively elastic revenue source that has
become the primary own revenue source in most district council
budgets. It is problematic in many ways, but its low effective rates
minimize the distortions that it creates. Local governments have

152

Restructuring Local Government Finance in Developing Countries

precious few productive revenue sources. Why change something that
works?
There is another important consideration. The timing for refonn
may be bad. The decentralization policy and implementation of the
municipal boundary demarcation has shocked the system enough.
There also are other changes under discussion concerning local
government, e.g., property tax reform, implementing the provisions of
the Local Government Municipal Systems Act, and electricity
privatization. Why add to it with another major revenue change? If the
RSC levy is to be reformed, it could wait for a few years until there is
less on the local government agenda.
There is also the point that the RSC levy is a local government
revenue source and, to many, is preferred to any centralized solution.
The local governments are not likely to trust central solutions, and there
could be significant political resistance. There is a widespread feeling
that if the national government received the money first, a fair share
would not find its way down to the local government treasury. National
emergencies or new priorities would always be in the wings as
significant reasons to divert the funds to national government purposes.
The RSC levy in its present form, however imperfect, is a tax whose
collections are controlled by the local governments.
Critics of the 'leave it as is' approach can make strong substantive
arguments in favor of moving ahead with reform. The RSC levy is
badly and unfairly administered, as documented in the discussion
above. It is more in the nature of a contribution by local businesses
than it is a tax. The RSC levy is also subject to the complaint that its
burden is borne nationwide, but its revenues are more localized in the
bigger cities because much of the tax is paid at the headquarters
location. This problem is likely to grow worse. Because it is in the
nature of a donation, there is no assurance that revenue growth can be
maintained. Finally, its major component is a turnover tax, and there is
some question about whether a gross receipts levy has a place alongside
a VAT in a modem tax system.18 One could make the case that such an
imperfect tax is hardly the right cornerstone for the tax structure of
local governments in South Africa. Unless it is reformed, it will remain
a kind of donation to local government by local businesses and will
remain outside the control of the local councils.
On balance, the basic issue probably is not whether the RSC levy
should be reformed, but whether this is the right time to do the reform.
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Option No. 2: Convert the RSC Levy to a True Local Government
Tax
The RSC levy could be converted to a local tax, with local government
administration of the tax. The local government would be giveTJ.
authority to set the tax rate within prescribed limits, and would be
empowered to assess and collect the tax. There is much to say for this
option. First, local governments in South Africa would have a revenue
source over which they could exert some control to raise or lower
revenues. Elected local councils, who would set the tax rate, would be
accountable to voters over how the money was spent. This could lead
to improved public services. This option would be consistent with the
government's decentralization strategy.
Second, the local council would have an incentive to increase
revenues and would have the power to improve the administration of
the RSC levy. As the RSC levy is converted from a donation to a tax,
revenues would rise significantly and administration would be
improved. More money would be available for infrastructure and for
supporting the issuance of long-term bonds. The revenue position of
urban local governments would likely be improved most.
This solution also has significant drawbacks. First, giving local
governments the option of levying a turnover tax provides the district
where the headquarters is located the opportunity to export the burden
of the tax to other jurisdictions of the country, i.e., to the place where
the purchases occur. This violates the basic correspondence principle
of local taxation, and could lead to a situation where residents of rural
and smaller municipalities are paying for the provision of urban
services.
A second drawback is that this tax would be costly to administer. A
major training and procedural effort would have to be mounted to
prepare the local governments for this new responsibility. Assessment
and collection of the RSC levy would require training of financial
analysts and auditors who would be responsible for verifying
assessments, and for the installation of a collection system. It would
also require a taxpayer information and assistance service. All of this
implies a quite significant one-time cost (especially outside the metros),
as well as the maintenance of a staff of significant size to operate the
RSC levy.
Third, compliance costs would rise. Businesses now self-assess and
make payment. Under this proposal, their self-assessment could be
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challenged and would require supporting evidence. Moreover, non 
filers would more likely be pulled into the system and required to
comply. Most taxpayers do not like stricter compliance requirements;
hence this proposed reform would generate political resistance.
Fourth, major changes in the legal structure of the tax and its
administration would be required and this would raise timing, legal, and
political issues. Significant legal hurdles would have to be overcome.
For one, the laws would have to be changed to allow local governments
to issue assessments, and to inspect and audit the accounts of
businesses. Another important legal change is that significant penalties
would have to be adopted as part of the new tax structure, and district
governments would need powers to enforce this law. This proposal is
likely to face significant opposition from the business community who
would anticipate both an increase in taxation and an increase in
compliance costs, and from the national government who would see the
RSC levy as a competitor for the indirect tax base in South Africa.
Fifth, the Constitution would have to be amended to allow local
governments to collect this tax, which is in effect both an income and
sales tax (neither of which is constitutionally open to local
governments).
Option No. 3: Turn the Administration of the RSC Levy Over to
SARS

A third option, often discussed, is that SARS could assume full
administration of RSC levy. It could, for an established fee, act as the
collection agent for the local governments. All else (tax rate, tax base,
etc.) would remain as it is. Certainly there are advantages to this
proposal. Arguably, the administration to do this is in place, and a
costly duplicative local government tax administration could be
avoided. In theory, administration would be much improved and
therefore more fair. Assessments would be made by the SARS
collector on behalf of the councils, and all assessments automatically
would be verified against value-added returns and income tax returns.
This is all provided for in the present law. Taxpayers could submit the
tax as part of their VAT or income tax return, thereby minimizing
compliance cost. A collection fee of 2 percent would be approximately
equal to the administrative costs presently borne by the councils. The
remaining 98 percent would be deposited in the council account.
Another advantage of this approach is that it would be perfectly
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consistent with allowing the local governments to set the tax rate,
thereby providing a measure of local government fiscal autonomy.
Each budget year the district council could vote the RSC levy rate, up
to a prescribed ceiling. Neither SARS nor the Treasury would have a
say fn this. 19
Since there would be penalties and an inspection threat, and since
SARS could do regular cross-checks against VAT and income tax
records, one would expect a significantly greater revenue yield than
under the present system. Would this approach yield more than option
no. 2? One view is that local governments will 'try harder' because
they are collecting their own tax. Another view is the SARS has the
more efficient machinery: (a) the payroll and sales records are on file;
(b) a more highly trained staff is in place; and (c) all VAT and income
tax audits could automatically include an RSC levy audit. The answer
to the revenue productivity question probably depends on 'How hard
will SARS try?'
There are major drawbacks and questions about this approach. First,
it leaves the turnover tax component of the RSC levy in place, and so
the national government tax administration would be collecting both a
turnover tax and a value-added tax from each VAT-registered taxpayer.
One tax eliminates the pyramiding problem the other embodies it. A
fair question to raise is whether a combination turnover-VAT has too
many offsetting features to be a good long run solution for local
government finance. Among these, in addition to the pyramiding
problem, are: (a) incentives for vertical integration; (b) administrative
and compliance costs; (c) biases against high turnover enterprises; and
(d) taxpayer confusion.
Second, there is the issue that SARS would have little incentive to
collect this tax, because they would receive none of the revenue. Even
with payment of a 'commission' it is doubtful that the incentive would
be adequate. Perhaps an even more important issue is whether SARS
has the capacity to take on this additional administrative burden, i.e., do
they have excess staff capacity or would this take away from the
efficiency of their duties as collectors of national government taxes?
Would the marginal cost of collecting the RSC levy be inconsequential,
or would it divert significant time and effort of SARS assessors and
collectors away from VAT and income tax?
Another issue that arises is collection from those enterprises with tax
liability below the floor level for VAT. Registration and collection from
these firms would be administratively burdensome and possibly not
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revenue productive. SARS would likely argue that the time of its staff
could be better spent increasing the compliance rate for larger firms.
Option No. 4: Abolish the RSC Levy and Adopt a Payroll Tax
The RSC levy could be replaced with an equal yield payroll tax. The
tax base would be all wages and salaries, as under the present RSC
levy. All self-employed and withholding taxpayers would be liable.
The local government would choose a tax rate on payrolls, within limits
prescribed by the national government. The tax would be collected by
the national government, at the same time as the national income and
payroll taxes, and then remitted to the appropriate municipalities. A
collection fee would be deducted before transfer to the local treasury.
The transfer of funds would be clearly prescribed in the law.
There are some very significant advantages to this option. It is a tax
where the burden is mostly borne by those who benefit from local
services (assuming that the headquarters problem can be minimized by
shifting exclusively to a payroll tax and eliminating the turnover tax).
It provides local autonomy, because local governments may choose the
tax rate, within limits. It provides for administrative efficiency because
the national government collects the tax, and it lowers compliance costs
(at least by comparison to most of the other options suggested). SARS
will have no disincentive to collect because the base will be identical to
its own payroll tax. It would be more progressive than the present RSC
levy in terms of the distribution of tax burdens.
There also are drawbacks. Some of these are quite major:
• It is a tax on labor in a high unemployment economy, and another
payroll tax, the Skills levy, has recently been introduced. At the
margin, such a tax would discourage employment. The
disincentive to employment may be very small, but it will be
present.
• It may not be horizontally equitable. It will tax labor income, but
for administrative reasons, will likely miss most self-employed
income and possibly much of the informal sector. Moreover, it
would not include capital income in the base; hence those who
earn from rents and dividends would be advantaged.
• It will accentuate fiscal disparities because many rural councils
will have very little payroll tax base.
• There is the question of the legality of a local payroll tax.
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The seriousness of these problems will depend in part on the level of
the payroll tax rate chosen. If the nominal rate is low enough, the
'employment effect' and the horizontal inequities might be significantly
discounted. We have estimated the payroll tax rate that would have
been necessary to hold every district and metropolitan council at
approximately its 1997-1998 level of RSC revenues. These rates are
presented in column (2) of Table 5.6, and the percent increase over the
present rate is shown in column (3). The results suggest that an average
effective payroll tax rate of about 1.1 percent would be required to hold
RSC levy revenues at present levels. The maximum rate under this
scenario would be 1.6 percent (Eastern Gauteng). Local governments
would be required to increase their rates by 78 percent on average.
Two issues are worth noting here: first, these rates are calculated
against the existing payroll tax base for the RSC levy. The actual
nominal rate would be much less than the estimates shown in Table 5.6.
This is because the base of the payroll tax would be much larger if it
were collected by SARS. Second, the overall burden on South African
taxpayers would not be higher than it is now under the scenario
presented in Table 5.6. The turnover tax would be abolished. The
revenue collected from the new payroll tax would be exactly equal to
the revenue that would have been collected from the present RSC levy.
General Issue: Should SARS Absorb RSC Levy Administration?
Underlying options no. 3 and no. 4 is the issue of whether SARS
could/would take over administration of the RSC levy. Option no. 3
would require taking over the RSC in its present form, and option no. 4
would require administering a piggyback local government payroll tax.
The general view of SARS (based on interviews) appears to be that
they would be resistant to any reform that would complicate the
administration of national taxes. Clearly, both of these options would
complicate the tax administration task for SARS. The collections from
every business would have to be assigned to a district council and this
would introduce new reporting requirements and some degree of
arbitrariness. However, administration of the two components of the
RSC levy (turnover and payroll) imposes two very different kinds of
burdens on SARS.
Consider first the administration of the turnover tax. SARS has
experience with VAT. Collection of a gross receipts tax from firms
already on the roll could be done with a minimum of difficulty. SARS
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Table 5. 6 Payroll tax rates necessary to eliminate turnover tax
component ofRSC levy

District
AmatolaDC
Benede OranjeDC
Bloem AreaDC
Bo KarooDC
BophirimaDC
Breede RiverDC
BushveldDC
Cape Town Metro
CentralDC
DiamantveldDC
DrakensbergDC
Durban Metro
EasternDC
Eastern Free StateDC
Eastern GautengDC
Eastvaal DC
GoldfieldsDC
HantamDC
HighveldDC
Ilembe DC
IndlovuDC
Johannesburg Metro
Kalahari DC
KeiDC
Klein KarooDC
Kyalami Metro
Lekoa-Vaal Metro
Lowveld EscarpmentDC
MzinyahtiDC
NamaqualandDC
NorthernDC
Northern FreestateDC
OverbergDC
Pretoria Metro

Existing rate New rate
0.3166
0.3000
0.3450
0.3330
0.2500
0.3000
0.2850
0.2500
0.2500
0.3300
0.3450
0.3000
0.2500
0.3000
0.3740
0.3300
0.2500
0.3300
0.3400
0.3000
0.3000
0.4182
0.3000
0.3500
0.3360
0.3800
0.2960
0.3100
0.3000
0.3648
0.2850
0.3135
0.3470
0.3648

1.0553
0.8231
0.8267
1.0069
0.7896
0.9300
0.7125
1.4318
0.6887
0.9706
0.9509
0.9581
0.3500
0.7582
1.6255
1.1349
0.5381
1.0645
1.1624
0.9091
0.7573
1.3940
1.0962
0.9409
0.8964
1.2667
1.0527
0.9558
0.7299
0.9822
1.1015
1.4172
0.9914
1.1768

Percent change
73.9
52.3
48.2
67.4
54.0
63.0
42.8
I 18.2
43.9
64.1
60.6
65.8
10.0
45.8
125.2
80.5
28.8
73.5
82.2
60.9
45.7
97.6
79.6
59.l
56.0
88.7
75.7
64.6
43.0
61.7
81.6
110.4
64.4
81.2
cont.

►

159

The Regional Service Council Levy

Table 5.6 Payroll tax rates necessary to eliminate turnover tax
component ofRSC levy (continued)
District
RustenburgDC
Sentrale KarooDC
Southern CapeDC
SouthernDC
StonnbergDC
UguDC
uThukelaDC
uThunguluDC
West Coast DC
Western GautengDC
Western RegionDC
Wild Coast DC
WinelandsDC
ZululandDC

Existing rate

New rate

Percent Change

0.2750
0.3400
0.3200
0.2500
0.3100
0.3000
0;3000
0.3000
0.3020
0.2500
0.3820
0.3500
0.2500
0.3420

0.6875
0.8388
1.0482
0.9033
0.7688
0.3000
0.9947
1.0063
0.8508
0.6620
1.1553
0.4084
1.2324
1.0364

41.3
49.9
72.8
65.3
45.9
0.0
69.5
70.6
54.9
41.2
77.3
5.8
98.2
69.4

presently requires supporting information on gross sales in order to
compute value added tax liability. However, companies report gross
sales in a consolidated return, with no identifiers as to where the
physical transaction took place. The introduction of a requirement to
report every sale according to the local government in which it took
place would be a significant complication. Moreover, there is an
underlying question of which council should be credited with the
revenue from a turnover tax collection. For example, a large bank may
now do all transactions at headquarters and not at the branch. Should
all of the revenue from a transactions tax be credited to the headquarters
office where the transaction was carried out? Such complications will
almost certainly lead to notional allocations, and this is not the business
ofSARS.
A piggyback payroll tax levy is more feasible. SARS already
collects the individual income tax from employers. In addition, it
collects other payroll-based levies (UIF levy and Skills le ),
�
de ductible by the employer from the payroll of employee eammgs
below a given limit. These revenues are intended to be channeled to the
U nemployment Insurance Fund and the National Education and
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Training Fund respectively. Why not just tack the RSC levy on to this?
For registered taxpayers, the RSC levy, UIF, and Skills levy have the
same tax base (total wages and salaries); hence all could be filed on one
return. The problem again would be the allocation across local
governments. For companies doing business in one jurisdiction, this is
no problem. For companies doing business in many jurisdictions it
would be a problem because SARS does not presently ask for a separate
schedule showing a breakdown of employment and payroll tax liability
by local government. Neither would SARS want to be responsible for
working out the allocation.
On the other hand, centralized administration of a payroll tax could
be feasible. It could easily be added to the return since the same base as
is levied for other payroll taxes would be used. It would require,
however, that each firm attach a statement showing the allocation of its
payroll tax, by location. While adding some complexity, this would not
seem an insurmountable obstacle, and most businesses could handle it
quite easily.
An overarching problem is that the SARS organization is not
perfectly suitable for collecting local taxes. First, the district offices of
SARS do not match up with local government boundaries. Some SARS
districts cover multiple councils, some district councils lie in more than
one SARS district, and some metros have more than one SARS district.
(This is not necessarily bad for enforcement purposes, but it makes data
collection very difficult.) There are 42 SARS collection districts, with
five in Cape Town, 11 in the Johannesburg area (40-50 percent of all
collections), three in KwaZulu-Natal and 23 spread across the rest of
the country. There are five regional offices to which these branch
offices report, including one each in KwaZulu-Natal, Guateng, Mapul,
Free State, and Western Cape.
Second, SARS is moving towards a more streamlined system of
centralized processing of returns. This would mean a more centralized
system of record-keeping and a much greater possibility for electronic
transfers. The Cabinet has approved this program, and rapid
implementation is planned. This may not be compatible with the
collection needs for a local government tax.
We might summarize this discussion by noting that SARS seems to
be headed in a different policy direction than is the national
government's fiscal decentralization program. The former is
concentrating primarily on increasing the compliance rate, simplifying
administration, and gaining the efficiencies of administrative
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simplification. It will likely be a tough sell to get SARS to
enthusiastically embrace the notion of administering local taxes,
especially local taxes that would introduce complications into the
reporting by South African business taxpayers.

General Issue: The Need for a Local Business License
SARS collection of a payroll tax is more feasible than SARS collection
of a turnover tax. However, in neither case is it reasonable to expect
SARS to register, assess and collect from small firms that are below the
threshold of existing national government levies. The administrative
effort required would be far out of line with the revenues gained.
Moreover, when the national government raises the VAT threshold, or
de-emphasizes compliance efforts for smaller firms, local government
revenue collections will suffer.
Yet, small firms should not be excluded from payment of local
government taxes. They are users of local services, and important
voting members of the local community. They can be reached with a
business license fee, perhaps levied as a flat amount. Every business
would be required to register annually and display a decal at their place
of business. Compliance checks could be provided by a linkage to
property tax or to property transfers. This could produce significant
revenue with relatively little administrative cost.

Option No. 5: Abolish the RSC Levy and Adopt a VAT-Based
Grant
A more centralized option than the first four presented above would be
to abolish the RSC levy and replace it with a grant based on a surcharge
on the value-added tax. A revenue neutral surcharge on VAT in 19971998 would have required an increase in the VAT rate from 14 percent
to 14.97 percent. Under a surcharge plan, an amount equivalent to
approximately 1 percent of the value added base would be dedicated to
a 'local government fund', as a replacement for the RSC levy. The size
of this fund would grow in proportion to the growth in the value-added
tax base; hence the local and the national governments would be tied to
the same tax-income elasticity.
The problem would be how to distribute this fund among local
governments. Clearly, there is no objective formula that will exactly
reproduce the present distribution of RSC levy revenues. There will be
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'winners' and 'losers' with any formula chosen. Countries usually deal
with this by introducing 'hold-harmless' provisions during the system
transition. There would seem to be three methods open for distribution
of such a fund. The first is derivation. Each council would be allowed
to retain the amount of VAT collected in their jurisdiction that is
equivalent to the yield of a 0.97 percent VAT rate.20 This has the
disadvantage of being counter-equalizing, but the advantage of
providing a significant base of revenue support for the urban local
governments. However, it raises again the headquarters problem since
firms will report VAT liability according to headquarters location.
Second, the grant fund could be distributed by a needs-based
formula. One possibility would be the equitable share formula. This
would be equalizing but it would penalize the higher-income councils.
How would their lost revenues be made up? Another drawback is that
this approach could channel significant revenues to local governments
that do not have the capacity to spend the funds.
Third, the national government could distribute the grant fund on a
more ad hoc basis, perhaps in the form of conditional grants. This has
the disadvantage of not being consistent with the national government's
decentralization policy of providing some degree of autonomy to local
units of government.
The VAT surcharge-grant does have some appeal as an option. It
eliminates the turnover tax. If distributed by an expenditure needs or
fiscal capacity formula, it eliminates the need to determine where a
transaction took place or where an employee worked. It also gives the
local government sector access to a productive and elastic revenue base,
i.e., the grant pool will grow as fast as VAT collections. In addition, it
should be administratively 'better' than the present RSC levy and
should impose no additional compliance cost. The marginal cost of
collecting the higher VAT rate is near zero. Because the VAT surcharge
would be better administered than the current RSC levy, it can raise any
amount of rand with a lower effective rate than was faced by most firms
who paid the previous RSC levy. Finally, there need be no over all
increase in the tax burden on South Africans. The increase in the VAT
would be set exactly equal to the reduction in the RSC levy.
There also are drawbacks to this option. Since it is a grant instead of
a local tax, it will be a step back from local autonomy and will remove
one major revenue source where the local governments had an incentive
to stimulate collections. In addition, the distribution of this revenue
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pool could be very contentious if done on a derivation basis, because
this will favor the big cities and will keep in place the 'headquarters'
problem. In fact, VAT collections almost certainly will have to be
carried out at the headquarters location. But if grant revenues are
distributed on a formula basis, for example by the equitable share
formula, then this also will be contentious. Many will argue that local
governments in the rural areas will now receive windfall revenue that
they are unable to spend properly. The increase in the VAT rate might
be argued to take some 'taxing room' away from the national
government, and it might be seen as competition to national
government revenue mobilization efforts. Finally, there is also the
'flypaper' concern, i.e., the revenue will first land at the national level
and it will stick there.
Option No. 6: Replace the RSC Levy with a Compensating Grant
Another possibility would be to abolish the RSC levy and replace it
with a compensating grant to local governments. In other words, if the
RSC levy would have yielded X rand in 200 I, it would be replaced with
a national government grant of X rand in 2001. In each successive
year, the size of the grant fund would be determined by the national
government. Many countries have introduced such 'compensating
grants'.
One could find some advantages to this approach. It would enable
elimination of the turnover tax, and it would resolve the RSC levy
administration problem. Businesses would no longer be burdened with
any RSC levy. It would lead to a reduction in administration and
compliance costs.
But this proposal would have a great many drawbacks. The notion
of'compensating' can be defined in year one, but how about the future?
What would the tax have yielded in 2002, 2003, etc? This leaves local
governments at the mercy of the center in deciding on the allocation,
and all but eliminates transparency in vertical sharing. A second
Problem is the horizontal distribution. Would the grant fund be
distributed as a formula grant? If so, would it be distributed on a
counter-equalizing basis in order to hold harmless the larger urban areas
that finance local services heavily from the RSC levy revenue? Finally,
th is option has the drawback of being a step back from local autonomy
and from a long-run program of fiscal decentralization. An implication
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is that the district councils would be completely at the mercy of the
national government in terms of revenue, i.e., the districts would no
longer have a si gnificant, defined source ofrevenue. Likewise, although
they have access to property rates, the revenue independence of
metropolitan governments would be significantly reduced.
Option No. 7: Replace the RSC Levy with a Mixed Grant-Payroll
Tax System

Another reform option is to eliminate the RSC levy but to drop the
constraint that it must be replaced with a single instrument. It is widely
recogn ized that urban and rural councils have quite different capacities
to tax and to spend. A program where more urbanized areas are given
taxing powers and the predominantly rural areas receive compensating
grants is another possibility for replacing the RSC levy. The
metropolitan councils (category A municipalities) are highly urbanized
and the district councils (category C municipalities) vary in their degree
of urbanization. In the following discussion, we always consider the
metros as urban. The districts tend to be more rural, but some have
significant urban populations, and this should be recognized in
reforming the RSC levy. We do not include the local municipalities
(category B) in the discussion because they do not currently have
access to the RSC levy. This situation could change in the future
depending on the decisions made about expenditure and revenue
assignments, as discussed in Chapter 2.
The Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development
(undated, p. 19) raised the question of an urban-rural asymmetry in a
discussion document prepared for the White Paper on Local
Government (Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constit utional
Development, 1998): 'Should a different system of local government
be developed for rural areas or should there be a uniform system for
urban and rural areas?' One version is the following:
• Urban areas would be given the power to levy a payroll tax,
perhaps subject to some maximum rate. The national government
would collect the tax along with its own payroll taxes and remit
the money to the local unit where the collection took place.
Urban areas could collect a general business tax from the smaller
firms that are not in the central net.
• Rural areas would receive a general-purpose grant, and would
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have no RSC taxing powers. The size of the national grant pool
would be fixed at some amount greater than the difference
between the present total level of RSC levy revenues and the
amount of RSC levy revenue raised by those local governments
who would be given the power to tax. The distribution of the
national grant fund among local governments would be according
to the same formula as the equitable share transfer. The
distributable pool for this grant would be grown at the same rate
as the equitable share pool.
Areas that are significantly urban but not metros would be given the
option to join either system. Once a council joined the taxing system, it
could not return to the grant system. A more detailed discussion of how
such a system might work is presented in Box 5.1 located at the end of
this chapter.
There would be significant advantages to this approach. First, the
turnover tax would be eliminated, and urban councils would no longer
be able to export tax burdens to the rest of the country. Second, the
problems with local government administration of the RSC levy would
no longer be an issue because the payroll tax would be administered by
SARS. Third, this approach would provide decentralized taxing powers
for urban local governments. This would bring more accountability to
their elected councils and likely a greater rate of revenue mobilization.
Fourth, urban local governments would have an income-elastic revenue
source. Fifth, the payroll tax is less regressive than the present RSC
levy, hence there would be some improvement in the distribution of tax
bur dens. Sixth, different urban areas would have different tax burdens.
This is appropriate because the cost of providing public services varies
across urban areas and citizens in high cost places should pay more.
The tax cost in urban areas would be greater than the tax cost in rural
areas.21 Seventh, the national government would not incur any
significant cost in administering this program. The urban areas would
l evy their own payroll tax. The rural grant program would impose no
additional cost. Finally, the national government could control the
overall cost of the program. The grant fund could be set at some
amount less than the total RSC levy (which would be abolished), hence
there would be no real cost. The urban tax (it could be thought of as an
urb an services charge) would be over and above this and would not
Place any cost on the national government. The overall change in tax
burdens on South Africans would be the difference between what the
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RSC levy would have yielded, and the sum of the urban services tax
and the grant fund.
This program, like any, has some disadvantages that would have to
be addressed. First, the payroll tax increases the price of labor relative
to capital and may discourage employment. Second, the urban local
governments will mobilize more resources with the payroll tax, but they
also will compete with the national government for tax revenues. The
more they raise from the payroll tax, the less discretionary room the
center will have to increase its own income taxes. Third, the payroll tax
is not horizontally neutral in that it will not cover non-wage income and
may miss much of the informal sector. Fourth, the collection of the
payroll tax by SARS would require each business to allocate its payroll
tax by district. Fifth, there is no fiscal decentralization for rural local
governments in this plan. They would not receive any additional taxing
powers. In fact, in future years, many district councils will be at the
mercy of the national government in terms of the determination of the
vertical share for the grant pool unless other revenue reforms are
undertaken to assist them. Finally, the provisions for graduating from
the 'grant' group of councils, to the 'tax' group, could be complex.

CONCLUSIONS
In considering the future of the RSC levy, one is torn between being
pragmatic and advising on good policy. The easiest political course is
to 'leave it alone'. The issue is not so much that there are great virtues
to the RSC levy, but that any replacement proposal will bring on a new
and unwanted debate. The center will not want to give up a significant
claim on the national tax base to local governments. Some local
government officials are hesitant to take responsibility to impose taxes
on their constituency. The RSC levy is a badly flawed tax, but perhaps
not flawed enough to cause these political obstacles to be put aside.
The great advantages of the RSC levy are that (a) it is a known
quantity; (b) it is a major revenue source for district and metropolitan
councils; and (c) it is levied at low nominal rates. Perhaps the most
telling statement about the RSC levy is that its many shortcomings are
forgiven because they are hidden by the low rate at which the tax is
levied.
Despite these arguments for 'leaving it alone', the RSC levy is in
fact a very bad tax and a poor choice for a revenue source to support
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expenditure responsibilities. As argued in the previous chapters, one
should always begin the fiscal decentralization policy planning with the
expenditure side. In this case, the first question to be answered is 'how
much revenue do the district councils need to finance the services
assigned to them?' Until this question is dealt with, as discussed in
Chapters I and 2, the issue of how much money should be raised by the
RSC levy, and to which municipalities the money should go, cannot be
resolved.
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Box 5.1: How the mixed system would work
Each district council would be assigned to one of two groups: (a) the 'tax
group', or (b) the 'choice group'. All metros would automatically join the tax
group, and would be authorized to levy a payroll tax in amount up to 2 percent.
Collection would be by SARS, with an agreed-on collection fee. The base ol
the tax would be the same as other government payroll taxes. Each payer would
be required to identify payroll tax liability by district.
The 'choice group' could elect either the payroll tax or a grant. The grant
would be distributed from a fund whose size would be determined by the
national government. The distribution among districts would be according to a
formula, perhaps the same formula as used for the equitable shares allocation.
The expectation is that the more urban and/or industrialized places would
choose the payroll tax.
How much would such a program cost? Consider first the view of the
national government. The net 'cost' would be the size of the local grant fund
necessary to support those in the 'choice' group who chose the grant option.
This could be as little as 42 percent of the present level of RSC revenues.* To
the extent that non-metro councils elect the payroll tax option, the grant fund
would be smaller. So, the cost to the national government could be relatively
small, perhaps as low as 0.2 percent of GDP. If the national government opted
to increase the grant fund, this would raise the cost to the national government.
The other way to look at 'cost' is to ask about the increased burden on South
African taxpayers. This is the more relevant issue from a point of view of
public policy. The change in Total Burden (6TB) will be equal to:
6TB=PT+ GF-RSC
where PT = payroll tax collections
GF = grant fund revenues
RSC = Regional Service Council levy revenues
Under one scenario, we could set

In this case, overall burdens would rise or fall depending only on the choice of
the payroll tax rate by the urban councils.

Note: * Metro districts now collect 58 percent of RSC revenues.
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It should be pointed out that some countries do levy sub-national government
turnover taxes. Among other places, it is a major source of revenue of provinces
in Argentina, where it accounts for about half of own revenue (Schwartz and
Liuksila, 1997). However, the criticism of local turnover taxes is strong
everywhere they are used.
Such piggyback arrangements are widely used in the US. About two-thirds of the
state governments tie their income tax base to federal adjusted gross income.
Most states have piggyback arrangements with their local governments for either
sales or income taxes.
This is similar to the VAT-sharing systems in effect in Russia and China.
The overall local tax burden is already higher in metropolitan areas than in the
rest of the country, so this proposal would reinforce a difference that already
exists. On average, locally collected revenues in metropolitan councils amount to
13 percent of household income in metros, but only 4 percent in small towns and
rural councils (Department of Finance, 1999).
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